Social role valorisation (SRV) theory has been a defining and initially revolutionary influence in the disability field in recent decades. Many of the concepts first associated with social role valorisation theory so much underlie and suffuse much of routine practice in the field of disability, that it is no longer easy to disentangle what is the substance of social role valorisation theory from the many partially or wholly derivative ideologies and theories that have come along behind it. These could arguably include such presently popular notions as social inclusion, “person centredness”, “self-determination”, the social model of disability, and the like, most of which are measurably consonant with, in their essence, many central aspects of both the early and later forms of formal social role valorisation theory. At least for purposes of workable activist coalitions, the conceptual overlap is considerable and obvious.

It is harder to make such a similar claim about “rights” largely because there does not exist any distinguishable and conceptually distinct vision of rights that is unique to the disability field. More often than not, “rights” related thinking in the field largely follows the patterns found in the larger culture. Even attempts to craft a unique vision of “rights” for the field, as can be witnessed at the moment in the current American absorption with “self-determination”, has largely just demonstrated the application of ideas developed elsewhere. In particular its ideological roots are libertarian more than communal, individualistic more than collective, and rather silent on the classic enigmas of responsibility, impaired competence and constraining values on unrestricted liberty.

 If one comes at the issues in the disability field with an interest that is informed by other popular theories and ideologies, (at least amongst progressives), then it is not surprising that these become a yardstick in appraising whatever theory is established in the field. In the case of people with disabilities, this has meant addressing existential concerns such as social devaluation and dehumanization, powerlessness, segregation, poverty, mistreatment and so forth. Not surprisingly, concerned people have looked to many other social movements for both moral and theoretical paradigms that could possibly apply to these concrete concerns. Thus it is not all that surprising that a “rights” perspective would become one of these starting points, given the ubiquity of rights consciousness in the latter part of the twentieth century. “Rights” have become a very accessible vocabulary to speak of both human aspirations and oppressions, and are now endemic in the discourse of western societies whenever they confront human mistreatment.

It is interesting that virtually the bulk of human rights legal codes have been written in the second half of the twentieth century, with the majority of these barely a generation old. Much of what the late twentieth century considered “rights” might have been unrecognizable in the western world prior to the Enlightenment. Even then, the seminal notions of “natural law” as the authorizing basis for such “rights” would have been met with puzzlement, as most educated people of the period would have attributed the endowment of irreducible dignity in humans to be due to the gift of a soul by the Creator. Even the French, and later the Americans, with the founding of their versions of revolutionary constitutional republicanism, saw the source of their rights to be inextricably bound up with God’s “hosting” relationship of both humankind and the State. As such, the dignity of humans was perceived by them as a gift of their Creator, and thus was inalienable given its transcendental assurance by God.

 Notwithstanding these origins, by the time of the late twentieth century, the notion that humans possessed an inherent worth, value and dignity had become almost a self-evident philosophical starting point for much of the logic of concerned social activists, as well as many other people. This conviction easily suffused into a “rights” focussed citizenship and polity. Rather than spell all this out people simply assumed a universe of “rights” as part of civic life. It became a convenience to asserting that people simply “had rights” irrespective of from whence these came.

Nevertheless, a distinction could be drawn between what are actual legal rights, and what might be more precisely thought of as common decencies that people in a culture think “ought to” be normatively accorded to people. In this sense, not all of the inherent dignity of people could or was protected by law, and much remained that could only be afforded by everyday people in the customs and attitudes of daily life. The term “human rights” might, in casual use, confound these quite disparate uses of the notions of rights, though they are bridged somewhat by a underlying shared sense that people ought to be treated with respect and value.

This notion of “rights” as possibly resting on some manner of natural ethical foundation is, of course intriguing, due to the many cultures that have tended to seek to uplift human conduct and to seek and support ethics that could guide this search for virtue. It is also remarkable that the United Nations sought, in its declaration of the universal rights of humankind, an expression of these ethics in the rather prosaic language of “rights”.

 It is also true that the common use of the idea of “rights” also somewhat obliquely referenced a tacit recognition that both individuals and societies could transgress against the inherent worth and dignity of people, and “rights assurance” was often seen as the just remedy for such transgressions. Thus “getting one’s rights”, “having one’s rights respected”, “fighting for one’s rights” all became a way of speaking obliquely to the “evils” of social devaluation, discrimination and mistreatment. Whether the actual acquisition of these narrowly cast civil rights actually proved to be a satisfactory remedy, remained an article of faith for many. For most disadvantaged people such distinctions are quite academic, as they tend not to change either the reality of their oppression or bring its relief any closer. The limits of “rights” as a remedy has gained greater importance and clarity in the recent civil rights era, as it has become clear that the legal banishment of discriminatory treatment has not quite “got to the bottom of” what causes or prevents people from mistreating and misrepresenting others.

Even so, many social movements have arisen in which the affirmation of “rights” as both a vision of a better life, a remedy for oppression and as an inalienable entitlement have been prominent. These have been part of an authorizing justification for activism(s) of various kinds directed towards social change and, (sometimes), personal change as well. In particular, the American civil rights movement, coupled with the anti-war movement and a surging feminist movement, provided much of the overarching template for activism and reform in the present “baby boom” generation. This initial cultural template was given added fuel by the strength of various expressions of people’s movements, lingering neo-Marxist ideologies, confrontational aspects of environmentalism and what might be thought of as quasi-religious social activisms of various genre, such as liberation theology and even communitarianism. “Rights” have become a very accessible vocabulary to speak of both human aspirations and oppressions, and are now endemic in the discourse of western societies whenever they confront human mistreatment. To say that an apparent fidelity to the ultimate place of “rights” serves as a “given” of political posturing and credentials amongst activists, is to state the obvious.

For our purposes here, it is highly symbolic and potentially instructive to note that social role valorisation theory, on rare occasions, has been portrayed by a small number of people, as possibly being a culprit in the continued oppression of persons with disabilities. Such an accusation would probably not be worth mentioning as an event, as such instances are rare and barely noticed. However, from another angle, the fact that such statements could possibly pass a casual test of credibility ought to be seen as revealing much more symbolically than may be apparent. This is because, at the level of substance, such a statement is utterly preposterous and indisputably the exact opposite of the demonstrable facts concerning the theory. Moreover, it is the unmistakable opposition to the social devaluation of disadvantaged people that forms the core insights of SRV theory and, just as importantly, the moral track record of its adherents. The fact that such a perverse proposal even has polite standing is therefore most significant.
This kind of charge must be seen as an attempt to dislodge SRV’s place as a central theory by attempting to undermine its moral credentials. It can also be seen, on another level as part of a more encompassing struggle within the field to speak to the voices, insights and realities that any doctrine can suppress once it has become orthodox. In this sense, the moral impulse to search out even greater truths that any convention would permit constitutes the kind of dissidence and disquiet with packaged truths that gave SRV its initial hearing amongst the disenchanted.

Such attempts ought not be seen, however, as necessarily attacks on the substance of the theory, as the intention and effect may actually be to politically reverse the theory’s standing so as to allow in fresh air. In other words, to diminish its dominant influence by tarnishing its image. This may not be therefore always an attack on the substance of this theory or any other so much as it is an attempt to fend off the dead hand of orthodoxy itself. Behind this may well be the hope of gaining traction for other possibilities.

 In normal political life such an effect might easily be achieved if the status quo could be made to seem to be aligned somehow with the dark and oppressive forces of society. Ideally, this could best be “proven”, or at least insinuated, if it could be shown that SRV, (or any other target for that matter), lacked a sufficient regard for the “rights” of a given socially oppressed or devalued group. Such is the power of the political ornamentation of “rights” that one’s political credentials may rest on whether one is seen to be unreservedly in favor of slogans such as “rights”, “choice”, “self-determination”, “empowerment” and other such emotive totems as may have currency with particular constituencies.

Thus “rights” become a key symbolic tool to be used to both achieve and deny legitimacy as they have now become a coded way of talking about the maintenance of perceived political ethics. In fact, rights language may well coexist with unacknowledged political ambitions of all kinds. It is undoubtedly no accident that so many organizations that oppress people with disabilities are so adept at pointing out how they are very much in favor of “rights”. After all, who would argue with “rights”. However, the point here is that “rights” might well be able to cover up many “wrongs”.

The fact that all these instances of “rights posturing” can easily disguise agendas, that are far from coincident with the interests of people with disabilities, is often lost on people who are too easily reassured by what they personally want or wish these words or incantations to mean in practice. Such political, and often moral naiveté, is nonetheless a normal enough human fact, and can be used rather shrewdly by skilful people to justify any number of harmful policies. The “Red Scare” experience, the Salem witch-hunts and other periodic moral and political panics, are never far from re-occurring under other contemporary guises. In the disability field, we have witnessed an almost promiscuous self-announcement campaign by endless agencies, governments and other vested interests who have assured us that they are “values based”, in favor of the consumer/family, supportive of progress and so on, whilst behaving in ways that are quite at variance with these. Perhaps the most memorable in the perverse use of otherwise valid terms was the claim by cynical governments in the United States that residential institutions were indeed the “least restrictive option” for people when they clearly were not. There has been a constant parade of various variations of these claims that people have a “right” to impoverished options, by attempting to justify them as the authentic “choice” of the individual, (or even these days as being “person-centered”).

Nonetheless, as they undoubtedly recognize, it has become politically fatal to be seen to be somehow at odds with any claim of infringement of “rights” or any other comparable potent symbol associated with what is said to be good for people. For those accused of damaging people’s rights, such a political charge creates a problem on two levels. On the one hand, there is the actual substance of whether any person’s (or groups) authentic interests and integrity have been damaged. This might be thought of as the factual “content” of the issue. On another level, there is the image problem of failing to maintain the appearance of conformity to a respectful public observance of “rights”, fairness, decency or whatever other symbol has been degraded. This second credential is essentially a political image credential, and should not be confused with the “substance” or “content” issue itself.  An analogy could be drawn here between what is called “spin” these days in politics, and the actual facts of the matter. As has been known for generations, “spin” can easily trump facts. Such is the fickleness and manipulability of human perception. Nonetheless, the acceptance of the reality that these exist can be helpful for any group that wants to make its case in the public arena.

 The case of attempting to equate SRV theory with being an attack on the rights of oppressed people is an instructive case in point in regards to the extent to which defenders and supporters of SRV have largely yielded some measure of legitimacy to the absolutist use of rights claims. In the case of the attempt to portray SRV as somehow malignant, this has occurred by the casting of SRV, by at least some critics, as being a theory that imposes a kind of prescriptive conduct on persons with disabilities. Sometimes these prescriptions might be alleged to be the promotion of “middle class values”, the imposition of outright involuntary conformity, and the relinquishing of individual autonomy.

The general thrust of such charges is that SRV is the agent of society and that it urges a strategy of social control, conformity and emasculation of the choices and autonomy of persons who are socially devalued. Such claims, as have been sketchily described here, assert or at least insinuate a kind of fascist dictum at the core of SRV theory. As will be shown shortly, this kind of suggestion is utterly groundless, and entirely opposed to the entire thrust of the theory. Nevertheless, such portrayals of SRV occasionally gain ground and underlie much of the reflexive dismissiveness of SRV we see today in various corners of the field. The point here is not what the facts actually are as to the truth of the theory, but rather to note the role assigned to it in popular perception, and how this came to be. At the same time it is important to also see this effort in its more positive light as part of an adaptive effort to ward off rigid orthodoxy.
            It is instructive, in regards to the actual facts of the matter that there appears to be no organized group of persons with disabilities that has come out against mainstream social role valorization doctrines. These doctrines would include according to persons with disabilities equal and normative treatment by society, supported and dignified social inclusion, the challenging of stigmatizing stereotypes, raising consciousness and support for valued social roles and expectations for people and so on. While there are certainly many people with disabilities who do not embrace the theory in its entirety, it would be hard to make the case that the vast majority of persons with disabilities have rejected the core practical advances in community living associated with the theory. In fact, the most visible, though rarely very enduring critics, have tended to be families of persons with disabilities who feared the loss of what they believed were secure institutional placements for their family members.

  In regards to a second tentative “criteria for moral dislodgement” offered here, it is useful to recognize that the strength of such an ostensible argument would need to rest upon establishing a tangible legal or civil right that SRV theory has unambiguously argued for suspending. It is noteworthy that the actual published record of Wolfensberger on SRV theory, perhaps the most extensively available and definitive source of SRV theoretical writings in academic circles, has not yielded even one defensible citation for the argument that SRV favors the reduction or even curtailment of the specific or general rights of any known group, socially devalued or otherwise. In other words, there is no known statement that has ever been cited in which SRV authorities, such as Wolfensberger, have argued for any limitation of any right, save those limitations common to most legal rights, e.g. when the rights of one person infringe upon those of another person.

 Moreover, the written argumentation of SRV theory is massively consistent with the intention to rectify the mistreatment of oppressed people and to restore to such persons their normative human and legal rights. More importantly, it repeatedly and without deviation, argues for the advancement, protection and safeguarding of the rights of socially devalued people. It has, in its early normalization theory formulations, and in its later construction as SRV theory, consistently spoken to the enhanced vulnerability of socially disadvantaged people to being treated poorly. In fact, normalization theory is routinely cited as a decisive influence in overcoming the system of institutionalization of devalued people and their restoration of citizenship.

 Social role valorization theory explicitly challenges virtually all of the expressions of social devaluation that have become socially institutionalized as an unquestioned pattern of sub-human treatment by society overall, not just the acts of individuals. The central tenet of SRV theory has been to correct this, as much as may be possible, by arguing for the conscious extension to oppressed persons of the personal, cultural, economic and political treatment and rights that would pass muster as being expected behavior for citizens who are not at risk of social devaluation.

 By stunning contrast, there appears to be no evidence put forward whatsoever of an explicit unambiguously clear missive from any authoritative SRV source that explicitly calls for the poor treatment of any group in society. Hence, all that can be said is that many people do not believe what they have read of SRV theory itself, or they have not read it and are relying on what critics are claiming it says. It is notable that this “reading in” or projecting onto SRV theory, of some kind of anti-rights agenda, would not pass even the crudest test of documentary evidence normatively satisfactory for making a legal claim.

 Assertions of this kind, as scandalous as they are, are inevitable as a kind of ongoing political testing of the support for theories and the constituencies that uphold them. It is simply part of the usual theatre of posturing that accompanies the politics of any field. They usually are easily rebuffed providing that they are groundless. However, this is only true if they are met with some kind of vigorous opposition. When they are left unchallenged, then it is easy for a momentum to build based on the constant repetition of false statements that are taken to be true due to their ubiquity. In time, these may become institutionalized as mythologies much in the same way that often repeated stories become urban legends. The key to their survival or not is whether they face routine public challenge.

 Nevertheless, if one can see the wisdom of the kind of relentless search for a more encompassing truth than that which society has entrenched in its established order, then it becomes possible to recognize that the juxtaposing of SRV and rights, or any “x” and “y” may miss the point. The reality of the ongoing and well-disguised social devaluation of disability is that it is an aspect of human beings and their social lives that will not easily be liberated by any intellectual orthodoxy. On the contrary, it is much more likely that the devaluation will be denied. Whatever theory is in vogue will simply be turned to the advantage of the underlying interests in our lives and communities that would deny that they exist and that they are part of harming people.

 It actually doesn’t matter much at all if “rights” wins, or SRV wins, or some other concoction wins, if people’s lives remain difficult, oppressive and degrading. Thus, the more crucial challenge in defining ethics that will matter is to not make their independent evaluation a political popularity test. This is where substance must trump appearances. The ethics that will matter over the long term will not be the ones that gain momentary approval or esteem, but rather the ones that actually make life better for people. The moral history of SRV appears to have much to commend it in comparison with other efforts. Nevertheless, what we should learn from all this sniping at it is that, like any other construct that holds some part of the important ground, it is being questioned and tested. Even more importantly, one can discern the unspoken message that a greater truth must surely await.